In the Stackelberg duopoly experiments in Huck et al. (2001) , nearly half of the followers' behaviors are inconsistent with conventional prediction. We use a test in which the conventional self-interested model is nested as a special case of an inequality aversion model. Maximum likelihood methods applied to the Huck et al. (2001) data set reject the self-interested model. We find that almost 40% of the players have disadvantageous inequality aversion that is statistically different from zero and economically significant, but advantageous inequality aversion is relatively unimportant. These estimates provide support for a more parsimonious model with no advantageous inequality aversion.
is rarely observed. Specifically, in one set of their random-matching experiments, in which anonymous subjects are randomly assigned the roles of leaders and followers in a Stackelberg game and the design ensures that each pair of players interacts once, the behavior of the Stackelberg followers is inconsistent with conventional prediction.
Conventional theory predicts that a follower, after observing the leader's output level, will react according to a downward-sloping best response function with particular values of the slope and intercept parameters. However, the followers behave according to this best response function in only 50.9% of the experiments. 1 Moreover, Huck et Table 6 ) estimate a linear regression model of the followers' choices, and find that the estimated parameters are significantly different from the conventional predictions.
After presenting the experimental evidence, Huck et al. (2001) suggest that the inequality aversion model of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) may be helpful in explaining the Stackelberg followers' behavior. Following Fehr and Schmidt (1999) , they assume that some players have non-standard preferences and that a player in this group cares about the absolute level of her payoff as well as how her payoff compares with her opponent's.
They then argue that, compared with the inequality aversion model, the conventional self-interested model is less consistent with the Stackelberg followers' behavior in their experiments. In their specification, the null hypothesis of the conventional selfinterested model is tested against an alternative model with a linear best response function different from that of the self-interested model. However, it is questionable whether the Fehr-Schmidt model actually delivers a linear best response function. A related drawback of their procedure is that when the null hypothesis is rejected, it is not clear how the estimated parameters are related to the underlying behavioral structure.
We think that conventional econometric methods, when applied appropriately, will be useful in understanding whether individuals mainly care about their own payoffs or payoff comparison matters significantly. There are two objectives in this paper:
one methodological and one empirical. Methodologically, our objective is to derive a testing procedure such that the null hypothesis of the conventional self-interested model is nested as a special case of an inequality aversion model. Empirically, we in one set of their experiments-the Stackelberg games with random matching ('STACKRAND' in their notation). We do not use their fixed-matching data set (in which the same pairs of players interact over several periods), because the theoretical predictions developed in this paper focus on a situation in which the players interact only once.
2 apply the derived test to see which of the above two models is more consistent with the data. It turns out that the hypothesis of the conventional self-interested model is rejected, and we further use the estimates of the inequality aversion model to simplify the theoretical model. We address both of these objectives in the context of the Stackelberg duopoly game (as in Huck et al., 2001 ).
To examine these issues, we need to first derive the likelihood function of a sample of Stackelberg followers' choices based on the inequality aversion model. We find it helpful to consider a simplified version of the Fehr-Schmidt model that retains the model's essential idea but allows meaningful estimation. In a two-player (Stackelberg leader and follower) game, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume that players with nonstandard preferences have the following utility function:
where
F is the Stackelberg follower, z i is player i's material payoff, α i is her disadvantageous inequality aversion parameter, and β i is her advantageous inequality aversion parameter. After reviewing previous experimental studies, Fehr and Schmidt (1999, To summarize, the simplified Fehr-Schmidt model considered in this paper is given by (1) and
where While we also assume two types of individuals in this paper, we allow the parameters to be estimated. 
where i, j = L, F with i 6 = j, q i is the output level of player i, and d > g ≥ 0. One interpretation of (6) is that the price of a homogenous product either depends linearly on the sum of the two players' outputs or is zero (if the sum of the outputs is too high), and g is the constant marginal cost. Note that except for the different roles of the leader and follower, the two players are symmetric with the same material payoff function.
Each player chooses the output level within a closed interval
Note that within this interval, we have
where We first summarize the conventional predictions regarding the above game. According to conventional theory, each player chooses output to maximize her material payoff, given the behavior of her opponent. The subgame-perfect equilibrium predicted by conventional theory is as follows. Observing the level of output q L selected by the leader, the Stackelberg follower chooses q F to maximize 5 We assume q = It is straightforward to show that the best response function of the follower of this game is given by
We refer to the followers with 'standard' preferences as type S followers. The best response function of type S followers is given in the upper panel of Figure 1 . Anticipating that a follower will respond according to (9) , the leader chooses q L to maximize
The optimal choice of the leader is given by ). However, the leaders choose that value in less than 27.3% of the 220 trials. The prediction is even less accurate for experienced players (by looking at the outcomes of Round 9, the penultimate round), who choose the profit-maximizing level in 13.6% of the trials. 6 While it is also interesting to examine whether the Stackelberg leaders' behavior is consistent with the Fehr-Schmidt model, in this paper we choose to focus on the behavior of the experimental Stackelberg followers. This is because the predicted action of the Stackelberg leader depends on her expectation of the follower's type. Thus, any test about these predictions is a joint test of the underlying theoretical structure and the assumed expectations formation mechanism. 7 However, the predictions of the followers' choice (as in Section III) are purely based on the assumed behavioral model, since the follower has already observed the leader's action. We believe it is more fruitful to first focus on clean predictions of the followers' behavior, which are based solely on their preferences and not confounded by other auxiliary assumptions.
To explain the anomalies in Huck et al. (Table III of Fehr and Schmidt,   1999 ).
As mentioned in the Introduction, in order to provide a parsimonious explanation and to minimize computational problems associated with estimation, we simplify the 
III. BEST RESPONSE FUNCTIONS OF THE TWO TYPES OF FOLLOWERS
To examine the followers' behavior in this model, our first step is to transform (1), in which player i's utility level depends on the players' material payoffs (z i and z j ), into a form in which the utility level depends on the players' choice variables (q i and q j ). Using (6) and (7), player i's utility can be expressed in terms of the players' choice variables as follows:
In the following analysis, we study the optimal response of a Stackelberg follower, after observing the leader's choice. As the two types of followers have different inequality aversion parameters, their best response functions are different.
The best response function of type S followers is given by (9) , whereas the best response function of type NS followers is defined by
The analysis of the best response function of type NS followers is complicated by the fact that the utility loss due to disadvantageous inequality (resp. advantageous inequality) may or may not be relevant, depending on whether
is positive (resp. negative 
and
If a leader chooses a low output level in Interval A, it is shown in the Appendix that it is not optimal for type NS followers to choose q F in £ q, q L ¢ . As a result, disadvantageous inequality aversion is irrelevant for them. It can further be shown that if q L is in Interval A, then the best response function of type NS followers is given by
If a leader chooses a high output level outside Interval A, it can be shown (in the Appendix) that it is not optimal for a type NS follower to choose q F in the interval (q L , q]. As a result, advantageous inequality aversion is irrelevant but disadvantageous inequality aversion becomes potentially relevant. There is a qualitative difference in the behavior of type NS followers when the leader chooses an output level outside Interval A. In the Appendix, it is shown that if q L is in Interval B, the best response function of type NS followers is upward sloping, given by 8 Note that e q AB in (12) is given by the intersection of (11a) and the 45-degree line (q F = q L ), and e q BC in (13) is given by the intersection of (11c) and the 45-degree line; also see the lower panel of Figure 1 . Note that e q AB belongs to both Intervals A and B, and e q BC belongs to both Intervals B and C. The overlapping endpoints of the different intervals do not cause problems because the functions we focus on in subsequent analysis-q NS F (q L ) in (11a) to (11c)-turn out to be piecewise continuous.
On the other hand, if q L is in Interval C, the best response function of type NS followers is downward sloping, given by
The intuition of the difference in (11b) and (11c) is as follows. When advantageous inequality aversion is irrelevant, there are two components in a type NS follower's utility level according to (10)-she wants to maximize the first term (material payoff) but to minimize the second term (utility loss from disadvantageous inequality). To maximize the material payoff, the best response of the follower is given by (9) . In
Interval B, whether the follower uses (9) or (11b), the difference in material payoff is relatively minor (since the material payoff function is quite flat around the optimal choice) but the difference in the utility loss from inequality aversion is more important.
Therefore, the choice of a type NS follower that minimizes the utility loss due to disadvantageous inequality also maximizes (10) , and the follower chooses (11b). In
Interval C, the reduction in material payoff if the follower uses (11b) is relatively large.
As a result, minimizing the utility loss due to inequality aversion cannot compensate for the loss in the material payoff, and it is optimal for the follower to compromise between these two terms and choose according to (11c).
The best response function of a type NS follower is represented in the lower panel of Figure 1 . There are a number of interesting features. First, this function is continuous but is piecewise linear instead of smooth throughout the interval £ q, q ¤ . Second, the best response function of a type NS follower is upward sloping in Interval B (with a slope of 1) but is downward sloping in Interval C (and is less steep than in Interval A). Third, the best response function of type S followers is just a special case of that of type NS followers, when both parameters a and b approach 0.
IV. MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATION AND TESTING
The theoretical analysis of the simplified Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model in Section III shows that the best response function of Stackelberg followers with non-standard preferences is piecewise linear, with the intervals determined endogenously by the inequality aversion parameters. On the other hand, the best response function of the Stackelberg followers with standard preferences is linear. We now provide statistical analysis of this model.
The likelihood function of a sample of Stackelberg followers' choices
We first derive the likelihood function of the followers' choices conditional on the leaders' actions in a sample of n independent experimental trials. In the statistical model, we interpret that the theoretical predictions of the simplified Fehr-Schmidt model in Section III form the systematic part of the followers' behavior, and we introduce a random error term to capture other unspecified influences on their behavior.
To simplify the notation in the following analysis, we use x and y to stand for q L and q F , respectively. Let x i and y i represent, respectively, the leader's and follower's choices for the i-th (i = 1, ..., n) observation. If the follower in the i-th trial has standard preferences, then
where the best response function q S F (.) is given by (9) and the random error ε i is assumed to be independently and identically distributed according to a normal distribution N (0, σ 2 ). Alternately, if the follower in the i-th trial has non-standard preferences, then
where the best response function q NS F (.) is given by (11a) to (11c), depending on the value of the leader's choice x i .
According to the simplified Fehr-Schmidt model, the population of Stackelberg followers consists of proportion 1 − p of players with standard preferences, and proportion p of players with non-standard preferences. Thus, from an econometrician's perspective, the probability density of observing y i (conditional on x i and parameters a, b, p and σ) is given by
where f S (y i | x i ; σ) is the probability density of observing y i when the follower has standard preferences, and f NS (y i | x i ; a, b, σ) is the probability density of observing y i when the follower has non-standard preferences.
In the analysis below, we simplify f S (y i | x i ; σ) as f S (y i ) and f NS (y i | x i ; a, b, σ) as
From (14), (15), (9) and (11a) to (11c), we obtain
and the two indicator variables are given by
13 and
Therefore, the (log) likelihood function of observing a sample of n independent Stackelberg experiments is given by:
The ) with h = 24, 9 we obtain the results in Table 1 . 10 The maximum likelihood estimates of p, a and b are 0.388, 5.231 and 0.156, respectively. (19) is based on n independent trials (n = 220 in Table 1 ). However, the random-matching Stackelberg experiment data set in Huck et al. (2001) consists of 22 pairs of players, each with 10 trials. If we had the coding of individual subjects, it might be better to assume that the same follower would use either (14) or (15) in all 10 trials. Unfortunately, such detailed information for this data set has been discarded (private communication). The best we can do in this situation is to use (19), and this can still be justified if we make the perhaps more controversial assumption that a follower may use (15) with probability p and (14) with probability 1 − p in different trials. 10 Note that restrictions (3) to (5) are not imposed in the estimation. The validity of these restrictions will be examined, as discussed in the next paragraph.
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The estimated best response function of type NS followers is represented by the piecewise linear function ABDE in Figure 2 , whereas the best response function of type S followers is given by the straight line ACF. Among the 108 followers whose choice variables are not on the best response function of type S followers, 92 (85.1%) are above this line and 16 (14.8%) are below it.
Before providing interpretation of the estimated coefficients, in the next sub-section we will examine restrictions (4) and (5) on the inequality aversion parameters of the simplified Fehr-Schmidt model, under the maintained assumption that some players have non-standard preferences (i.e., 0 < p < 1). We will then test the null hypothesis of the self-interested model (i.e., p = 0) against the alternative hypothesis of the simplified Fehr-Schmidt model.
Testing the restrictions on the inequality aversion parameters
It can be concluded from Table 1 that the restrictions (4) and (5) suggested by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) are not violated. 11 We focus our analysis in this sub-section to see whether or not these restrictions can be further simplified.
To examine whether the disadvantageous inequality aversion parameter is equal to or strictly larger than the advantageous inequality aversion parameter, we use a one-sided t-test to test the null hypothesis Table 1 , the value of the t-statistic is calculated to be t = 3.84 and thus the null hypothesis a − b = 0 is rejected at, say, a 5% significance level.
To examine whether the advantageous inequality aversion parameter is equal to or strictly larger than 0, we test H 0 : b = 0 against H 1 : b > 0. The value of the tstatistic is given by t = 1.37. Thus, the null hypothesis that advantageous inequality aversion is unimportant (b = 0) cannot be rejected at a 5% significance level.
In the following analysis we further simplify the Fehr-Schmidt model by using the
instead of (4) . Following the same steps as above, it can be shown that the log likelihood function corresponding to the simplified Fehr-Schmidt model with no advantageous inequality aversion is given by
and f S (y i ), f B (y i ), f C (y i ) and D C (x i ) are the same as before. Note that when b = 0, (18a) becomes (17) and (18d) becomes (20a).
The maximum likelihood estimates of this model are given in Table 1 . It is observed that the estimated values of p and a are very close to those of the previous model.
The estimated best response function of type NS followers (with no advantageous inequality aversion) is represented by the piecewise linear function ACDE in Figure   2 . y 1 
where f S (y i ) is given by (17). The maximum likelihood estimates of this model for the Huck et al. (2001) data are given in Table 1 .
To test the null hypothesis of the self-interested model against the simplified FehrSchmidt model, we construct the likelihood ratio test statistic
where the unrestricted log likelihood ln L u is given by (20) and the restricted log likelihood ln L r is given by (21). Under the null hypothesis, the test statistic of (22) has a χ 2 -distribution of 2 degrees of freedom. Based on the estimation results in Table 1 , LR = 184.88. Therefore, the null hypothesis is strongly rejected.
12 12 The same conclusion is obtained if ln L u is calculated according to (19) when advantageous
Summary
To summarize, the self-interested model is decisively rejected against the simpli- Table 1 , there is a representative group of followers (39%) with non-standard preferences, and the estimated disadvantageous inequality aversion parameter is very high (at a value of 5.2). These conclusions are robust whether advantageous inequality aversion is included in the model or not.
Our empirical results are generally consistent with those in previous studies, but there are also new findings. First, the estimation results in Table 1 are consistent with the experimental evidence in Messick and Sentis (1985) and Loewenstein et al. (1989) that the subjects exhibit a significantly weaker aversion to advantageous inequality than to the aversion to disadvantageous inequality. Second, Goeree and Holt (2000) use the maximum likelihood estimation method to study inequality aversion in experimental alternating-offer bargaining games. They assume that all proposers have the same utility parameters, as do the responders. According to their findings, the disadvantageous inequality aversion estimate is 0.84, and the advantageous inequality aversion estimate is 0.66 for the proposers and 0.12 for the responders. Since they do not assume that a proportion of players have the standard self-interested preferences, the comparison with our estimation results is not direct. Nevertheless, it appears reasonable to conclude that, when compared with their results, our disadvantageous inequality aversion estimate is higher and advantageous inequality aversion estimate is lower. Overall, the empirical evidence on inequality aversion based on the Huck higher disadvantageous inequality aversion estimate and lower (and insignificant) advantageous inequality aversion estimate also reveal some quantitative disagreement with previous studies. Further research will be required to sort out the differences regarding the ranges of inequality aversion parameters found in various studies.
V. CONCLUSION
In Their behavior raises the questions of why the conventional theory fails by such an extent, and necessitates a better explanation.
In the Stackelberg duopoly experiments (as well as many other game-theoretic situations), testing the predictions of conventional theory is really a matter of testing the joint hypothesis of the players' (sometimes rather complicated) strategic behavior and the standard self-interested preferences. In the current case, the structure of the game is very simple (especially for the followers), and it is reasonable to assume that the players are intelligent enough to understand the game and behave strategically.
As a result, it is natural to seek explanations based on non-standard preferences.
While there are well-known models of social preferences in the literature, there are also critics of this approach who worry that altering the unobservable utility function would allow one to explain any phenomenon. In his book on behavioral economics, Camerer (2003, p. 101) defends the study of social preferences convincingly: 'The goal is not to explain every different finding by adjusting the utility function just so; the goal is to find parsimonious utility functions, supported by psychological intuition, that are general enough to explain many phenomena in one fell swoop, and also make new predictions.'
In this paper, we follow this idea and consider a parsimonious model of social preferences that nests the standard preferences as a special case to explain experimental Stackelberg duopoly. Our paper makes methodological and substantive contributions.
Methodologically, using the study of inequality aversion in the Stackelberg game, we illustrate that existing econometric methods can be applied to test a conventional self-interested model against a relatively new model of social preferences. We show that the best response function of the Stackelberg followers with non-standard preferences is piecewise linear, with the intervals depending on the inequality aversion and the associated likelihood function, will be useful in studies further examining these types of questions. More generally, we find that there is reason to believe that systematic application of econometric techniques to the study of social preferences can deepen our understanding of human behavior and motivation.
APPENDIX
Derivation of the best response function of type NS followers. 13 As the utility level of a type NS player depends on whether z F is larger or smaller than z L , we analyze these two cases separately (for each of the three intervals). Note that when either (i) h − q L − q F > 0 and q F < q L (i.e., area ODEG in Figure 1 ) or (ii)
h − q L − q F < 0 and q F > q L (i.e., area FGH in Figure 1 ), we have z F < z L and therefore,
On the other hand, when either (i) h − q L − q F < 0 and q F < q L (i.e., area EFG in Figure 1 ) or (ii) h − q L − q F > 0 and q F > q L (i.e., area OGHI in Figure 1 ), we have
Consider Interval A when q L ∈ £ q, e q AB ¤ . Using (A1), we show that for any q L in Interval A, U F is increasing in q F for q F ∈ £ q, q L ¤ . Using (A2), we show that for any q L in Interval A, U F is first increasing in
and then decreasing 13 In the following analysis we make use of well-known properties of quadratic functions. , q i . 15 Thus, the best response of a type NS follower to q L in Interval C is given by (11c). 
